State Police in Nigeria: To be or Not to be ?

The Senate’s approval to establish state police and empower governors to appoint state Commissioners of Police is one of the most consequential federalism debates since 1999. Like the “overnight” National Anthem Bill, speed raises both hope and suspicion.

ARGUMENTS FOR STATE POLICE

Proximity and Local Intelligence

Strong point: Insecurity in Nigeria is highly localised — banditry in Zamfara, kidnapping in Edo forests, farmer-herder clashes in Benue, cultism in Rivers. A centrally controlled police can’t know every bush path or dialect.

State police officers, recruited from the state, understand language, terrain, culture, and flashpoints. Response time drops from hours to minutes.

Example: Amotekun in Southwest and Ebubeagu in Southeast already show that local outfits gather intelligence faster than federal police.

Decongests Federal Overload

The Nigeria Police Force is ∼370,000 for 220+ million people — about 1:600. UN recommends 1:450.

- States can recruit to match their threat level. Lagos may need 50,000; Ekiti may need 5,000. One-size-fits-all policing has failed.

Accountability to Local Communities

Governors and state assemblies are closer to the people than Abuja. If a DPO fails in Ilesa, the governor hears about it that evening, not via a memo to Louis Edet House.

State legislatures can pass laws tailored to local crimes — anti-open grazing, anti-cultism, forest guard laws.

Fiscal Federalism Principle

Security is the first duty of government. If states collect VAT, run courts, and build roads, why should policing be an exclusive federal matter?

24 of 36 states already fund “federal police” with vehicles, allowances, and barracks. State police formalises what states already pay for.

Multiple Layers Deters Abuse

Federal police, NSCDC, DSS, Army would still exist. State police creates inter-agency checks. No single governor controls all guns in his state.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST STATE POLICE

Risk of Abuse by Governors

Weak point: Nigerian governors have history of using state electoral commissions, state assemblies, and state media to crush opposition.

With police under them, “order from above” could mean arresting opposition candidates, dispersing rallies, or framing critics before elections.

Example: State Independent Electoral Commissions conduct LG polls where ruling party wins 99% — public trust is low.

Weak Institutions & Poor Funding

Many states can’t pay salaries or pensions. A poorly paid state constable becomes a tool for rent-seeking and political thuggery.

If appointments are political, promotion will depend on loyalty, not merit. We could create 36 “state SARs”.

Fragmentation & Jurisdictional Clashes

What happens when a crime crosses from Oyo to Osun? Which state police pursues? Without strong protocols, criminals exploit borders.

Rival governors could deny hot pursuit or withhold intelligence from each other during political feuds.

Ethnic/Religious Profiling

In ethnic diverse states like Plateau, Kaduna, or Nasarawa, a governor could staff state police with his ethnic group, turning it into a sectarian militia.

Minority communities would be vulnerable, especially during indigene/settler conflicts.

Cost Duplication

Nigeria would run 37+ police services — 1 federal + 36 states + FCT. Training colleges, forensic labs, intelligence units all duplicated.

Poorer states may end up with “boys in uniform” rather than professional police.

WEIGHING THE STRONG VS WEAK POINTS

Issue Pro-State Police Anti-State PoliceVerdict.

Security Local knowledge = faster response Abuse = new insecurity Strong if safeguards exist

Governors’ Power Governors already control security votes Giving them police = absolute power

Major risk

Federalism True federalism requires state policing Nigeria’s politics isn’t mature for it

Principle is sound, practice is risky

Cost States already fund police informally Poor states will run bankrupt units Only viable for rich states

Abuse Federal police also abused #EndSARS Decentralised abuse is harder to check Abuse shifts, doesn’t vanish

LOGICAL CONCLUSION

The problem is real: Nigeria’s centralised police has failed to secure forests, highways, and communities. Something must change. The status quo is not neutral; it’s already killing people.

The fear is valid Governors are not angels. In a country where LGA elections are 100% won by ruling parties, handing governors a police force without guardrails is asking for partisan militias.

Therefore, the answer is neither “yes” nor “no” but “yes, with ironclad conditions”.

State police should pass only if:

Appointment is insulated: State CP appointed by governor but confirmed by 2/3 of State Assembly and a State Police Service Commission with civil society, NBA, traditional rulers.

Removal requires same process.

Operational independence: Budgets and promotions handled by the Commission, not Government House.

Federal oversight: National Police Council sets training, firearms, and human rights standards.

Federal police can intervene where state police is used for political repression.

Phased rollout: Start with 6 states that can fund it — Lagos, Kano, Rivers, Kaduna, Delta, Anambra. Review after 3 years before others join.

Jurisdiction law: Clear rules on inter-state crimes, federal highways, and terrorism — those remain federal.

Bottom line: State police is necessary but dangerous. Nigeria’s insecurity can’t be solved from Abuja, yet Nigeria’s politics can’t be trusted with unguarded power.

If the Senate’s “overnight bill” lacks abuse-prevention clauses, we will swap one security crisis for a democracy crisis.

Pass it, but don’t pass it blind. The difference between Amotekun and a political thug squad is law, funding, and oversight. Write those into the bill before the ink dries.